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Reference to the notions of verifiability and observability is widespread in contract
theory. This paper is a contribution towards a formalization, and related character-
izations, of these two notions. In particular we first define them, through knowledge
operators, and then provide characterization results in terms of the relevant state spaces.
Since, when referring to a contract, observability typically pertains to parties while ver-
ifiability to the court, we define them differently. A main finding of the paper is that
for proper contract verifiability to obtain the court must imagine true states and have
information processing abilities as good as the parties.
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1. Introduction
The notions of observability and verifiability are fundamental in contract theory
[Holmstro¨m, 1982; Hermalin and Katz, 1991; Hart, 1995; Bolton and Dewatripont,
2005]. Indeed they refer to how parties to a contract, and the court that may have
to enforce it, would process the available information originated by the actual state
of the world (state henceforth). Even though both concepts refer to the ability
to correctly understand the state by the relevant agents, typically, in the litera-
ture, the term observability is associated to the parties while verifiability to the
court. Despite their widespread use and conceptual importance so far, the epis-
temics behind the two notions, that is how parties and the court should process the
relevant information, does not appear to have been investigated and characterized
in a rigorous manner. This seems to be an important missing point in the theory for
both because a formal characterization should convey the ideas more clearly and,
1750032-1
In
t. 
G
am
e 
Th
eo
ry
 R
ev
. 2
01
8.
20
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
SI
EN
A
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
20
. R
e-
us
e a
nd
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
is 
str
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s a
rti
cl
es
.
June 1, 2018 15:5 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR 1750032
N. Dimitri
moreover, because it would help reasoning on the needed conditions for observabil-
ity and verifiability to obtain. The issue is even more important in view of the fact
that, at least in principle, alternative definitions may be contemplated.
A first meaningful point which is often left unmentioned, that may potentially
distinguish the contract parties from the court, is that the latter would typi-
cally not only be asked to draw correct inferences on what really occurred, the
true state, but also to provide a (possibly) consistent (logical and with respect
to empirical evidence) argument motivating her final verdict. Indeed, for example,
Hermalin and Katz [1991] adopt a notion of verifiability which does not seem to
require the judge to justify the verdict. For this reason, their notion of verifiability
appears to be closer to our notion of observability. More specifically, we assume
that while observability may exempt parties from providing a correct justification
of their beliefs, this would not be the case for the court. In essence, the ability to
verify a contract seems to require a court with a degree of information processing
skills at least as good as the parties’. We shall see that this distinction lies at the
heart of our definitions and characterizations.
As for courts clearly, in reality, they may have a meaningful role in resource allo-
cation [Tirole, 1999; Djankov et al., 2003], to the extent that factors like possible
lack of competence, corruption, time constraints, difficulties in gathering relevant
information, etc. may bias the verdict. However, in this paper, we shall only investi-
gate a plausible characterization of courts who draw justifiable correct conclusions.
To do so, we only focus on the role of agents as “information processors” (IP),
however without discussing what their (possibly bounded) abilities are due to. More-
over, we will not touch upon strategic issues related to the formulation of optimal
contracts, as in Bernheim and Whinston [1998].
The framework we use has been widely adopted in economic theory to address
a number of foundational issues related to agents’ epistemics, such as the formation
of consensus [Aumann, 1976] and the investigation of sufficient conditions for Nash
Equilibria in normal form games [Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995].
We shall also discuss how our proposed formalization of verifiability could be
linked to the notion of awareness. In particular, we shall refer to the seminal version
formalized and discussed by Modica and Rustichini [1994, 1999] and further inves-
tigated by Dekel et al. [1998]. As pointed out by Heifetz et al. [2008] the extent to
which later models of unawareness, based on epistemic logic, are connected to Mod-
ica and Rustichini’s and Dekel et al.’s frameworks is not immediate. It follows that
this is also true for our setting. Epistemic logic approaches typically constructed
states building on elementary formulae and knowledge, modal, operators as prim-
itives; therefore, these models have high expressive power. In this paper instead,
states of the world are the primitives; in exchange for a lower descriptive ability
we believe this approach gains in simplicity with no major loss in effectiveness to
convey the main findings.
The work has the following structure. Section 2 is devoted to the fundamentals
of the model. More specifically, we formalize the information processing abilities of
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the agents to a contract, the notion of a contract, and discuss the interpretation of
the relevant state spaces that will appear in the analysis. In Sec. 3, we introduce
observability and verifiability of a single event, of contracts and briefly discuss the
relation between verifiability and awareness as defined in Modica and Rustichini
[1994]. Section 4 presents the main characterization results, in terms of the relevant
state spaces, for a given contract. In particular, we shall see that according to our
definition a contract is correctly observed when the relevant parties imagine only
states that can truly occur, but not necessarily all of them. This implies that correct
contract observability can still obtain when some of the states that can indeed
obtain, are not thought as possible by the parties. Verifiability instead requires the
court to imagine states which coincide with those that can truly occur. In this sense,
correct verifiability asks for a deeper understanding of the states that can possibly
take place. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Agents, Contracts and Relevant Spaces
In this section, we model the parties to a contract and the court as IP; what follows
introduces the basics of our framework.
Suppose Ω is the set of states (state space henceforth), with ω ∈ Ω being the
generic state, and let P (ω) ⊆ Ω be the possibility set associated to ω. A possibility
correspondence is a mapping P : Ω → 2Ω\{∅}, where 2Ω is the power set of Ω.
Events are subsets of Ω.
The possibility correspondence represents the set of states that IP thinks as
possible when ω obtains. The sets P (ω) model IP’s cognitive abilities at the true
state ω. The collection of P (ω), normally referred to as IP’s information structure
[Geanakoplos, 1989], is then taken to formalize her overall information processing
skills. Information structures allow for IP’s bounded rationality in interpreting the
world. However, when this collection is a partition of Ω such that ω ∈ P (ω), the
individual is typically considered to be a rational, consistent, IP. Perfect information
processing obtains when P (ω) = {ω}.a
Not surprisingly, since the court that we intend to model is a proper IP, we shall
ask her cognitive abilities to satisfy some of the epistemic properties underlying
partitions.
aThe reason why rationality is formalized by partitions can be better appreciated upon introducing
the knowledge operator. A knowledge operator is a mapping K : 2Ω → 2Ω which, for all A ⊆ Ω,
is defined as KA = {ω ∈ Ω|P (ω) ⊆ A}. Knowledge could be incorrect, in the very common sense
that personal beliefs may not correspond to reality. A partition of Ω obtains when for all A ⊆ Ω,
KA ⊆ A and ¬KA ⊆ K¬KA, where¬ stands for event complementation; i.e. ¬A = Ω − A. In
this case it also follows that KA ⊆ KKA. In axiomatic approaches, the first property is called
the axiom of truth, the second property axiom of negative introspection while the third property
axiom of positive introspection. Following the suggestion of one of the referees, in the Appendix
we further elaborate on why two remarkable properties of the knowledge operator, KΩ = Ω and
K(A ∩ B) = K(A) ∩K(B) are omitted. Indeed, they hold for any information structure and not
only for partitions.
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For an illustration consider the following simple example. Two parties, a and b,
signed a contract specifying that “if tomorrow it rains at day time, a pays 1AC to b
while if it snows b pays 1AC to a”. Suppose that indeed it does rain so that a should
pay b, but a refuses to. To resolve this case we have in mind a court that would be
able to gather, and correctly process, the information needed to draw appropriate
conclusions. Imagine that the only information the court collects is “there were
many people in the streets, there was some sun light, almost everybody was wet,
streets were wet, there were thunders”. The court should then rightly infer that it
rained, and so that a must pay b, without using the fact that “there was some sun
light” as the crucial piece of evidence motivating the verdict. We would moreover
want the court to be able to draw correct conclusions, even when a contingency
not specified in the contract would take place. Indeed, if it was sunny, rather than
rainy or snowy, we think that appropriate verification should again request the right
inference and possibly correct justification, so that no money would be transacted.
As far as observability is concerned, we understand its fundamental intuition as
given by the self-evidence of contract contingencies. Formally, event A is self-evident
for IP if A ⊆ KA, namely whenever it occurs IP believes in it.
When referred to contracts however, the sense in which we interpret observabil-
ity does not seem to require self-evidence over contingencies outside the contract. In
the above example, if the weather is humid, but neither rainy nor snowy, this may
not be self-evident to parties a and b. Nonetheless, it would not prevent parties’
consensus on contract contingencies when rain or snow were to obtain.
Alternatively, we see the decision concerning dismissal of a possible case mainly
in the hands of the court. Consider again the above example; party b (say), in case
of no rain but with very high humidity, may go to the court and make the case that
“since it was very humid it rained” and so a should pay. The fundamental point here
is not so much which contract contingency has obtained but, prior to that, whether
the contract should at all be implemented. We see this as a necessary component of
verifiability but not of observability. In view of the above considerations, the main
results of the paper will not be surprising.
2.1. Two relevant spaces
There are (N+1) agents: N parties to a contract and the court. To save on notation,
(N + 1) will indicate both the set and the number of agents. The (N + 1)th agent
is the court. In the model, the relevant timing would be made of three periods: (i)
before the contract is written (ii) after the contract is written and before the state
realizes (iii) after the state realizes. For our purposes however (i) and (ii) could be
merged together and the model reduced to two periods: before and after the state
realizes.
Definition 1 (True (Objective) State Space). The true state space T , with
generic element t ∈ T , is the set of states that can truly (objectively) occur.
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That is, the set T represents all objectively possible states of world and it is
independent of timing. As we shall see, the idea of correct information processing
is built on T .
The following definition instead introduces the relevant space of the parties,
before the state realizes.
Definition 2 (Contract Space). The contract space C, with generic element
c ∈ C, is the set of states identified by the parties in the contract.
Some comments are in order. The interpretation of C is analogous to that of T
but with the following important difference: unlike states in T those in C reflect
the parties’ subjective views of the world before the state realizes and might not
effectively (truly) occur. To illustrate the difference that we have in mind consider,
as an example, the following agreement between individuals a and b, stipulated
(say) on 31 July 2017: “If on 1 August 2017 the noon temperature in Rome is
below −50◦C, then a gives 100AC to b otherwise b gives 100AC to a”. Even though
it is perfectly conceivable that in Rome it could be so cold in the middle of the
summer, it did not happen and the assumed could not occur (given the actual state
in our solar system). In the agreement, individual b is the one who is more likely
to think the event as truly possible and be worried about it. In this sense, her
subjective view would be wrong.
Moreover, in a contract, parties do not associate clauses to single states of the
world defined in all possible details. They rather base their agreement on some
aspects of a state, namely on sets of states with common relevant characteristics.
For example, two parties may stipulate an agreement founded on whether or not
tomorrow it will rain in a certain location. The events tomorrow rains or tomorrow
does not rain in the specified location are defined by the set of states that include
those two contingencies in their definition.
2.2. Agents’ information processing ability
Each agent i = 1, . . . , N +1 is endowed with a possibility correspondence, P i : T →
2C\∅: that is, also the state space conceived by each agent after the state realizes it
is a subset of C. Moreover, for all events A ⊆ C, from P i we derive the knowledge
operator as
KiA = {t ∈ T |P i(t) ⊆ A}.
Finally, we assume the following.
Assumption. For all i = 1, . . . , N +1, C =
⋃
t∈T P
i(t) is the state space conceived
after the state realizes by both the parties and the court.
Therefore, C =
⋃
t∈T P
i(t) amounts to assuming that parties maintain the
same view of the world before and after the state occurs. We can now introduce
the general state space, containing the subjective and objective state spaces.
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Definition 3 (General State Space). Ω = T ∪C is the general state space, with
generic element ω ∈ Ω.
Notice that KiA ⊆ T . If ∼KiA is the set of true states in which A is not
known then, unlike the standard definition of set complementation, in this case
∼KiA = T −KiA ⊆ T and not ∼KiA = Ω−KiA, as it would be for nonepistemic
events, since T and Ω may not coincide. Henceforth, in the paper, this will hold for
all events including knowledge operators.
2.3. Contracts
Definition 4 (Contract). A contract is a partition Π of C, with Π(c) being the
partition element containing state c ∈ C. Then Π(c) is a contract contingency and,
moreover, Π(C) the set of all contracts (partitions) defined on C.
In other words, since a contract could be seen as a collection of contingencies,
each with an associated clause, for the purpose of the paper it could simply be
thought of as a family of disjointed and exhaustive subsets of C, each formalizing
a contract contingency (event). Defining a contract as a partition bears analogies
with the recent Ahan and Ergin [2010] approach to modeling partition contingent
preferences under uncertainty, where each partition represents a description of the
state space.
The following example, capturing an agency setting, illustrates Definition 4.
Example 1. Consider a Principal–Agent model (P–A), where A works for P in a
production activity, and his effort e could be either low (l) or high (h), with l < h.
As a joint result of A’s effort and of a random component, the outcome of the
production activity x could take two values, x ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, assuming that the
wage w(e, x) paid by P to A will only be conditioned on e and x, and that whether or
not the wage is paid by P can always be verified by the court, the relevant contract
space is defined by four states C = {c1 = (l, 0); c2 = (l, 1); c3 = (h, 0); c4 = (h, 1)}.
Hence, the reward scheme will characterize the contract as a partition of C. For
instance, suppose w(l, 0) = 0 = w(h, 0) and w(l, 1) = 0, 5 = w(h, 1), that is a
payment positively related to the outcome and independent of the effort level. Then,
the associated contract Π can be represented by the following partition of the space
C : Π(c1) = {c1, c3} = Π(c3) and Π(c2) = {c2, c4} = Π(c4). Instead, if the payment
scheme is for instance w(l, 0) = 0 = w(l, 1) and w(h, 0) = 0, 5 = w(h, 1), that is
based only on the effort, then the contract partition would be Π(c1) = {c1, c2} =
Π(c2) and Π(c3) = {c3, c4} = Π(c4).
3. Verifiability and Observability of Contracts
We are now ready to introduce the two main notions of the paper.
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3.1. Verifiability and observability of events and contracts
In the following definitions, the knowledge operator K refers to an IP with sub-
jective state space C; the true state space will still be T so that Ω = T ∪ C. We
start introducing the notion of event verifiability, which we shall extend to a con-
tract. The same will be done for observability. As for verifiability, the definition
aims to formalize the intuition that the court must draw a correct conclusion and,
furthermore, provide a consistent explanation of her verdict.
Definition 5 (Event Verifiability). Event A ⊆ Ω is locally verifiable at state
t∈T if there could be an IP such that t ∈ VA = (A∩KA∩KKA) ∪ (¬A∩∼KA∩
K ∼ KA) ⊆ T , where V : 2Ω → 2T is the verifiability operator. Event A is verifiable
if VA = T . Finally, the nonverifiability operator is defined as ∼VA = T −VA, with
∼VA ⊆ T .
Few comments are in order. First note that the definition captures a weak,
minimal, notion of verifiability. More explicitly, it establishes that an event/contract
is verifiable if there could be a court with the appropriate information processing
skills. Below, in Theorem 1, we shall see that with such a weak notion, contract
verifiability depends only on the relation between C and T . However, the definition
does not say if such a court will be effectively “available” in a specific situation. A
stronger connotation, which takes into account court availability, seems to be the
one most commonly used in the economic literature. Consider again a P–A setting
with moral hazard, where A’s action is hidden to P. Then a contract conditioning
A’s wage to his effort level could be verifiable according to our notion while typically,
in the literature, nonverifiable. This is because our definition captures the idea that,
in principle, there could be a monitoring device (however expensive) allowing the
court to verify the effort. Instead, in the literature, the notion of hidden action
typically means that such device, for whatever reason, is unavailable, even if C and
T satisfy Theorem 1 below. Later, analogous considerations would also hold for
observability.
We can extend the notion of event verifiability to contract verifiability.
Definition 5a (Contract Verifiability). Contract Π is verifiable if there could
be an IP such that all contingencies Π(c) are verifiable.
The above definitions formalize verifiability according to the idea previously
anticipated. In particular, IP verifies event A when she always correctly believes
whether or not A occurred, and properly motivates her conviction (belief). In Defini-
tion 5, correct beliefs are formalized by the operators KA and ∼KA. Indeed, when A
does not obtain, we do not impose in the definition that IP knows that ¬A occurred,
but only the milder requirement that IP should not believe that A occurred. How-
ever, as we shall see later, contract verifiability implies K¬Π(c) = ∼KΠ(c) for all
contract contingencies Π(c).
Therefore, when a contract is verifiable, condition K¬Π(c) = ∼KΠ(c) is derived
rather than assumed. Accordingly, with K ∼ KA we want to capture the idea of
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proper motivation: that is, when A does not occur IP knows why he does not
believe in A. Again, as we shall see, contract verifiability will imply KK¬Π(c) =
K ∼ KΠ(c) for all contract contingencies. To summarize, our definition entails
that with contract verifiability IP will “know whether contract contingency Π(c)”
occurred, but the same may not hold for all possible events in Ω.
Note that from Definition 5 it immediately follows that for all verifiable events
A the axiom of truth KA ⊆ A, of positive introspection KA ⊆ KKA and of negative
introspection ∼KA ⊆ K∼KA all hold.
To conclude, the relatively mild request on epistemic abilities embodied in Def-
inition 5a will enable the court to correctly decide whether or not a case based on
a contract should be dismissed.
The next definition still refers to an IP with subjective space C. It formalizes
event and contract observability according to the notion of self-evidence when a
contract contingency occurs. However, when it does not occur the definition simply
requires that IP should not believe it did occur.
Definition 6 (Event and Contract Observability). Event A ⊆ Ω is observable
if there could be an IP such that A ⊆ KA and ¬A ⊆ ∼KA. Contract Π is observable
if there could be an IP such that all contingencies Π(c) are observable.
The following continuation of Example 1 illustrates the difference between
observability and verifiability.
Example 1a. Consider again the P–Amodel of Example 1, where contract Π signed
by the parties is defined by Π(c1) = {c1, c3} = Π(c3) and Π(c2) = {c2, c4} = Π(c4).
Further, suppose that A can also undertake a medium (m) effort, and that T =
{t1, . . . , t6}, where ci = ti with i = 1, . . . , 4, t5 = (m, 0), t6 = (m, 1). If P i(t) = {t}
for t ∈ {t1, t2,t3, t4} and P i(t) = {t1, t2,t3, t4} for t ∈ {t5, t6}, with i = 1, . . . , (N+1),
then the contract could be observed by the parties but non verified by the court.
Indeed, V (c1) = V Π(c2) = V Π(c3) = V Π(c4) = {t1, t2, t3, t4} ⊂ T . However, at
states t5 and t6, when the agent effort is medium, the court has a limited understand-
ing of the objectively possible states failing to explain why, even though she consid-
ers both of them as possible, she neither feels sure of low (l) nor of high (h) effort.
As previously anticipated, we model observability of A in terms of self-evidence
of the relevant event and ask for IP not to believe in A when it does not occur.
Definition 6 can be considered rather demanding in the sense of excluding
that event nonobservability might occur because IP misinterprets the state space.
Indeed, it only allows nonobservability due to incorrect detection of a true state.
This is an important implication and, not surprisingly, we shall see that the two
previous definitions capture the intuitive idea that when observability and verifia-
bility of a contract hold, both the parties and the court only imagine truly possible
contingencies. They must be proper IP with, again, the important distinction that
observability does not require “motivating” beliefs at all true states.
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Although we consider Definition 6 to be the appropriate formalization of our
intuition, it is worth mentioning that a weaker notion of observability, one which
at true states would entail correct information processing of the kind appearing in
Definition 6, but which would also allow for an IP not necessarily imagining true
states, i.e., C − T = ∅, could be conceived as follows.
Definition 7 (Weak Event Observability). Event A ⊆ Ω is weakly observable
if there could be an IP such that A ∩ T ⊆ KA and ¬A ∩ T ⊆ ∼KA.
The following example may help clarifying the difference between the two defi-
nitions.
Example 2. Let T = {α, β}, P (α) = {α}, P (β) = {γ} so that C = {α, γ}
and Ω = {α, β, γ}. Take A = {α} and so ∼KA = {β}; hence, A ⊆ KA but
¬A = {β, γ} ⊆ ∼KA implying A, according to Definition 6, to be unobserved.
However, A ∩ T = A ⊆ KA and ¬A ∩ T = {β} = ∼KA so that A is weakly
observed. When A is not the case IP thinks {γ} (an impossible contingency) to be
possible. Although at {β} she has a fully incorrect view of the world, IP does not
however take the wrong decision of believing in A. In this weaker sense, she still
has enough understanding of A.
3.2. Relation between verifiability and awareness
The understanding of an event, according to our notion of verifiability, evokes in
a natural way some idea of awareness of that event. For this reason, we now dis-
cuss in more detail the relation between verifiability and awareness, as defined by
Modica and Rustichini [1994]. However, before doing so it is worth stating the fol-
lowing interesting property of the verifiability operator V .
Proposition 1. (i) If KT = ∅, then for all A ⊆ Ω is VA = ∅. (ii) If for all A ⊆ Ω
is VA = ∅, then KKT = ∅.
The above proposition identifies minimal (intuitive) conditions for verifiability.
In particular, necessity says that at least one state t must exist where all contin-
gencies believed by IP could truly obtain.
As mentioned above, the idea of verifiability is intuitively linked to the notion
of awareness, a topic which attracted much attention in recent years [Dekel et al.,
1998; Heifetz et al., 2008; Li, 2009]. Though casted in different frameworks, a main
common view shared by these contributions is that meaningful notions of unaware-
ness call for some “nonstandard” state space modeling. By allowing for the possibil-
ity that subjective and objective state spaces may differ, this work is indeed along
this same line. For the purpose of this paper, we shall confine ourselves to a simple
comparison between our nonverifiability operator∼VA and [Modica and Rustichini,
1994] formalization of unawareness. Modica–Rustichini define the unawareness
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operator UA ⊆ T as
UA = ∼KA∩∼K∼KA
= (A∩∼KA∩∼K∼KA) ∪ (¬A∩∼KA ∩ ∼K∼KA)
namely, ignorance of one’s ignorance, to capture the epistemic state of an individual
who does not even have A in her mind. This is explicit in the right term of the
definition, where it is clear that unawareness is independent of whether or not A is
obtaining; i.e., a state of unawareness is unrelated to empirical evidence.
Hence, in our more general framework, if at state t the individual is unaware
of A, namely t ∈ UA then either t ∈ (A ∩ ∼KA ∩ ∼K∼KA) or t ∈ (¬A ∩ ∼KA ∩
∼K∼KA), and it is easy to see that in both cases t ∈ ∼VA and so UA ⊆ ∼VA.
Therefore, the notion of nonverifiability is less strict than unawareness; alterna-
tively, if IP verifies event A then she is aware of it but not necessarily vice versa.
4. The Main Characterization Results
In this section, we formulate the main results of the paper, the proofs of which are
in Appendix A. The following theorem provides a full characterization of verifiable
contracts.b
Theorem 1. Contract Π ∈ Π(C) is verifiable if and only if C = T.
Therefore, in this case the only possibility to verify a contract is to specify only
those contingencies that can truly obtain. Any kind of misspecification might either
prevent the court from drawing correct inferences or their appropriate motivations.
Hence, verifiability of a contract requires a judge to have a good understanding
of the states that can possibly occur. Indeed contracts, such as the ones in the
following example, could not be verifiable.
Example 2a. Suppose T = {α, β} and C = {α, β, γ}; moreover, let P (α) = {α, γ},
P (β) = {β}, for the parties and the court, and consider contract Π= {{α, γ}, {β}}.
It is easy to see that Π is not verified by the above court and, more in general, is
not verifiable.
The example is interesting since the same setting, without state γ, would make
the contract verifiable. Namely, the mere introduction of what we may call a “phan-
tom” state prevents verifiability. This is so because, for event A = {α, γ}, it is
KA = {α} but KKA = ∅. That is, though the court at state α draws the correct
inference, namely that A is the case, there is no proper understanding of the true
reasons why it occurred since state γ, which is impossible, is considered as possible.
An analogous characterization can also be presented for observability.
Theorem 2. Contract Π ∈ Π(C) is observable if and only if C ⊆ T .
bOne of the referees suggested to rephrase Theorems 1 and 2 in a more extended way, which is
done in the Appendix.
1750032-10
In
t. 
G
am
e 
Th
eo
ry
 R
ev
. 2
01
8.
20
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
SI
EN
A
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
20
. R
e-
us
e a
nd
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
is 
str
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s a
rti
cl
es
.
June 1, 2018 15:5 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR 1750032
A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts
Theorems 1 and 2 establish that, given T some contracts may be observ-
able/verifiable while others may not. Indeed, it depends on the relation between C
and T : contracts for which C − T = ∅ can neither be observable nor verifiable, as
they would contemplate states that could not occur.c
Taking Theorems 1 and 2 together, we immediately obtain the following further
characterization, linking verifiability and observability, the simple proof of which is
omitted.
Corollary 1. If contract Π ∈ Π(C) is verifiable then it is observable.
In the economic literature observable, but nonverifiable, contracts are among the
explanations for incomplete contracts [Hart and Moore, 1999; Tirole, 1999], that is
contracts where parties do not include all welfare relevant contingencies. In the
model, this means that parties could anticipate that no court would exist to verify
some, or all, contract contingencies. This would require agents’ epistemics to be part
(at least informally) of the definition of a state of the world. With nonpartitional
structures this may not necessarily ask for parties to know the entire possibility
correspondence but, more simply, that courts cannot verify contract contingencies.
It may be interesting to further characterize a contract based on C, which would
be observable by the court but not verifiable. However, before doing so consider the
following example.
Example 3. Suppose T = {α, β, γ}, C = {α, β}; P (t) = {t} for t ∈ {α, β} and
P (γ) = C. Finally, let Π = {{α}, {β}}. It is easy to see that Π is observable but
not verifiable by a court. At t = γ the above court may be said to have a limited
understanding of the objectively possible contingencies failing to explain why, even
though it considers both of them as possible, it neither feels sure of α nor of β.
Example 3 suggests how we could proceed to provide what’s missing for verifi-
ability. In that case, when the true state is t /∈ Π(c), the court not only is unable
to take the correct decision but, more in general, a decision. She has only a par-
tial (though correct) view of the true world and when an unforeseen state obtains
she does not recognize it. It is this ability to decide, that would be meaningful to
introduce, and through which we now formalize the gap between observability and
verifiability.
Definition 8 (Decidable Contract). Contract Π ∈ Π(C) is decidable if there
exists a court such that
⋃
c∈C KΠ(c) = T.
That is, a contract is decidable if there is a court that always thinks one of
the contract contingencies to have obtained. Having introduced decidability we can
now state the following result.
cIt is worth noticing again that what really qualifies contract observability is Π(c) ⊆ KΠ(c), for
all contract contingencies. Indeed, the request ¬Π(c) ⊆∼ KΠ(c) is introduced to prevent parties
from drawing the wrong conclusion that a contract contingency took place, when it did not.
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Theorem 3. Contract Π ∈ Π(c) is verifiable if and only if it is observable and
decidable.
The above result formalizes the idea that contract verifiability requires higher
information processing skills than observability. This same point could also be made
from an alternative perspective. In the following theorem, the easy proof of which
is omitted, we formulate the result.
Theorem 4. Contract Π ∈ Π(C) is verifiable if and only if KΠ(c) = Π(c) and
K¬Π(c) = ¬Π(c) for all contract contingencies Π(c). Contract Π ∈ Π(C) is observ-
able if and only if KΠ(c) = Π(c) and ∼KΠ(c) = ¬Π(c) for all contract contingen-
cies Π(c).
Although neither observability nor verifiability require the axiom of truth to be
valid, for all possible events A ⊆ Ω, they both require it to hold for all contract
contingencies Π(c)
However, while verifiability implies the axiom validity also for their comple-
mentary events ¬Π(c), this is not so for observability, which could be seen as an
alternative way to characterize the difference between the two notions.
5. Conclusions
The paper provides a formal definition and characterization of the notions of
verifiability and observability, two fundamental and widespread concepts in contract
theory. Typically, in the literature, both of them appear to refer to correct detection
of the events (contingencies) specified in the contract. However, in the work, we con-
ceived this correct detection to be different in the two cases. Indeed, a sense in which
observability seems to be intended suggests self-evidence of contract contingencies.
However, when no contract contingency occurs no request, except for not drawing
the wrong conclusion that a contract event has occurred, is apparently requested
to parties’ information processing skills. Alternatively, when a true state does not
belong to the contract space, its correct detection would not necessarily be asked
to parties. Consequently, parties may not believe that any contract event obtained
without necessarily understanding that this is due to none of them having occurred.
This, evidently, cannot be so when verifiability is considered. In case of a con-
troversy among parties, the court should not only formulate a correct verdict but
also properly motivate it. Therefore, if a state not included in the contract is the
true one, the court would have to properly explain to parties that the case has to be
dismissed because no contract contingency applies. The main finding of the paper
says that for a contract to be verified the court’s state space must coincide with
the true state space. This agrees with our broad intuition, that no correct detection
of contract events and no proper motivation could be formulated unless the court
imagines states that are always truly possible.
1750032-12
In
t. 
G
am
e 
Th
eo
ry
 R
ev
. 2
01
8.
20
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
SI
EN
A
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
20
. R
e-
us
e a
nd
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
is 
str
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s a
rti
cl
es
.
June 1, 2018 15:5 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR 1750032
A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. If KT = ∅, then P (t) ⊆ T , for all t ∈ T . This means
that P (t) can neither be included in KA nor in ∼KA so that KKA = ∅ = K∼KA
which implies VA = ∅ for all A ⊆ Ω.
If instead, for all A ⊆ Ω is VA = ∅, then VT = ∅ and so T ∩KT ∩KKT = ∅.
Hence, if KT = ∅, then KKT = ∅ while if KT = ∅, then KKT = ∅, since if
KKT = ∅, then KT ∩KKT = ∅.
Proof of Theorem 1. Since in what follows we only refer to the court, to save on
notation superscript (N +1) will be omitted from the relevant epistemic operators.
Assume Π ∈ Π(C) to be verifiable, namely that for all Π(c) in the partition
contract Π, there is a court such that V Π(c) = T . We first show that C ⊆ T and
then that T − C = ∅. Indeed, since
V Π(c) = (Π(c) ∩KΠ(c) ∩KKΠ(c)) ∪ (¬Π(c) ∩ ∼KΠ(c) ∩K∼KΠ(c))
= KΠ(c) ∪ ∼KΠ(c) = T
and noticing that V Π(c) is the union of two disjoint subsets of T , for all t ∈ T it
must be either that
t ∈ Π(c) ∩KΠ(c) ∩KKΠ(c) = KΠ(c) (*)
or
t ∈ ¬Π(c) ∩ ∼KΠ(c) ∩K ∼ KΠ(c) = ∼KΠ(c) (**)
However, if (*) is true, then P (t) ⊆ KΠ(c) ⊆ T while if (**) is true, it is
P (t) ⊆ ∼KΠ(c) ⊆ T and since by assumption C = ⋃t∈T P (t) it follows that
C ⊆ T = Ω.
Suppose now that T −C = ∅. From (*) it follows that KΠ(c) ⊆ Π(c) ⊆ T while
from (**) that ∼KΠ(c) ⊆ ¬Π(c) ⊆ T , which taken together imply KΠ(c) = Π(c)
and ∼KΠ(c) = ¬Π(c). Then, for all t ∈ T − C and all c ∈ C it must be P (t) ⊆ C
and P (t) ⊆ Π(c), because otherwise verifiability would be violated. If Π(c) = C,
a contradiction follows immediately. Alternatively, there must exist states c and
c′ such that Π(c) = Π(c′) with Π(c) ∩ P (t) = ∅ and Π(c′) ∩ P (t) = ∅. But this
would imply P (t) ⊆ ∼KΠ(c), P (t) ⊆ ∼KΠ(c′), and so that t /∈ K ∼ KΠ(c) and
t /∈ K ∼ KΠ(c′) which means that at such t ∈ T − C neither Π(c) nor Π(c′) are
verifiable. Hence, the contract is nonverifiable, contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume now C = T = Ω, consider contract Π and take P (t) = Π(c), for all
t ∈ Π(c) and c ∈ C. Hence, for all Π(c) we have KΠ(c) = Π(c), KKΠ(c) =
KΠ(c),∼KΠ(c) = ¬Π(c) and K∼KΠ(c) = ¬Π(c) so that V Π(c) = T .
Rephrasing of Theorem 1. Suppose (T, P ) characterises the fundamentals of
the model, from the perspective of an IP, so that he can be identified with (T, P ).
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Consider any C and any Π ∈ Π(C). Then
(1) For any T such that C = T there exists some P such that Π is verifiable by
(T, P ).
(2) If Π is verifiable by (T, P ) then C = T .
In other words: for any T , any C and any Π ∈ Π(C) there exists some P such
that Π is verifiable by (T, P ) if and only if C = T .
Proof of Theorem 2. If Π is observable then for all c ∈ C and i = 1, . . . , N it is
Π(c) ⊆ KiΠ(c) ⊆ T and ¬Π(c) ⊆ ∼KiΠ(c) ⊆ T , entailing C ⊆ T .
Assume instead C ⊆ T ; then parties whose possibility correspondences, for all
t ∈ Π(c) and c ∈ C, satisfy P i(t) = Π(c) and, for all t ∈ T − C, satisfy P i(t) = C
would make the conclusion hold true.
Rephrasing of Theorem 2. As in the rephrasing of Theorem 1, consider any C
and any Π ∈ Π(C). Then
(1) For any T such that C ⊆ T there exists some P such that Π is observable by
(T, P ).
(2) If Π is observable by (T, P ) then C ⊆ T .
In other words: for any T , any C and any Π ∈ Π(C) there exists some P such that
Π is observable by (T, P ) if and only if C ⊆ T .
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose Π ∈ Π(c) is verifiable; then, by Theorem 1,
C = T and for all c ∈ C a court such that KΠ(c) = Π(c) would make Π observ-
able and decidable. Instead, if Π ∈ Π(C) is observable then Π(c) ⊆ KΠ(c) and
¬Π(c) ⊆ ∼KΠ(c); hence, KΠ(c) = Π(c) and ∼KΠ(c) = ¬Π(c). Moreover, decid-
ability implies
⋃
c∈C KΠ(c) =
⋃
c∈C Π(c) = T and verifiability follows.
Proof that KΩ = Ω and K(A ∩B) = K(A) ∩K(B).
The two properties derive directly from the definition of the knowledge operator,
and hold for any information structure, including but not exclusively, partitions.
Indeed, as for the former, since K : 2Ω → 2Ω it follows that P (ω) ⊆ Ω for all
ω ∈ Ω; therefore, KΩ = {ω ∈ Ω |P (ω) ⊆ Ω} = Ω.
As for the latter, suppose
(i) ω ∈ K(A ∩ B). Then P (ω) ⊆ A ∩ B; hence, P (ω) ⊆ A and P (ω) ⊆ B and so
ω ∈ K(A) ∩K(B).
(ii) ω ∈ K(A) ∩K(B). Then P (ω) ⊆ A and P (ω) ⊆ B; hence, P (ω) ⊆ A ∩ B and
so ω ∈ K(A ∩B).
So the two properties do not hold for partitions only but, more in general, for any
possibility correspondence.
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